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This  paper  uses  a  proportional  hazard  model  to  study  foreign  direct  investment  by 
Japanese  manufacturers  in  Europe  between  1970  and  1994.  We  divide  each  firm’s 
investment  total  into  a  sequence of  individual  investment  decisions  and  analyze  how 
firm-specific characteristics affect each decision. We find that total factor productivity is 
a significant determinant of a firm’s initial and subsequent investments. Parent-firm size 
does not have a significant influence on the initial decision to invest. Large firms simply 
have more investments than smaller firms. Other firm-specific characteristics, such as the 
R&D intensity, export share and keiretsu membership, also play a role in the investment 
process. JEL no. F23, L20 
 
 






Remark: The authors would like to thank Pravin Trivedi, David Audretsch, and seminar 
participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. Please address correspondence 
to Horst Raff, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 
24098 Kiel, Germany. E-mail: raff@econ-theory.uni-kiel.de. Phone: +49 431 880 1582. 
Fax: +49 431 880 3150. 
   1
1. Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has replaced international trade as the main driving force 
behind the global integration of product markets. According to UNCTAD (2004), 
aggregate sales by foreign affiliates have exceeded world exports for more than two 
decades. If one looks at the firm level, the typical pattern behind this development has 
been that firms that used to supply foreign markets through exports from a production 
facility at home have established production plants in those markets to supply them 
locally. This raises a number of questions, including which kinds of firms will switch 
from exporting to FDI, at what point in time will they switch, and how many investments 
will they undertake. We address these questions using data on Japanese manufacturers’ 
FDI into Europe during the period 1970 to 1994. In particular, we examine (i) how firm 
productivity, size and other firm-specific characteristics affect the likelihood and timing 
of a firm’s first manufacturing project in Europe, and (ii) whether these same 
characteristics remain as FDI influences as the firm continues to invest. 
The paper differs from previous studies of FDI in two ways. First, most of the 
existing FDI literature consists of proximity-concentration models that link the export-
versus-FDI choice to country- and industry-level determinants, including factor 
endowments, market size, trade costs and economies of scale (see Markusen 2002 for a 
recent survey). The current paper is about firm-level influences on the choice of FDI and 
about heterogeneity in the investment behavior of firms, issues on which there has been 
comparatively little systematic research.
1   
Second, we track a firm’s sequence of individual investment decisions, and are 
hence much better able than most previous papers to distinguish between those firm-
specific characteristics that determine a firm’s initial decision to invest and those 
influencing the firm’s subsequent investments. Why this matters can best be illustrated 
using a hypothetical firm-level data set. Suppose there are four Japanese firms, as 
                                                 
1 Since Hymer (1960) and Horst (1972), firm-level empirical studies have identified a firm’s size as the key 
determinant of its propensity to undertake FDI. Swedenborg (1979), Blomström and Lipsey (1991), and 
Trevino and Daniels (1994) have found firm size as well as R&D expenditures, export intensities, and 
previous investment experience all contribute to increased FDI likelihood. More recently, Helpman, Melitz 
and Yeaple (2004), Head and Ries (2003), Girma, Gorg, and Strobl (2004), and Raff, Ryan and Stähler 
(2007) have identified a firm’s productivity as a determinant of the choice between exporting and FDI. See 
Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a survey.   2
illustrated in Table 1, each with a different number of manufacturing investments in 
Europe between 1970 and 1994. Firm 1, for example, established a first affiliate early in 
the sample period, a second affiliate toward the middle of the period and then, in short 
order, two more affiliates (we do not consider subsequent investments into the same 
affiliate). Firm 2 set up only a single affiliate in the middle of the period, firm 3 
established two affiliates, and firm 4 has three affiliates.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Previous studies typically follow one of two approaches: (i) they pool all the 
investments for all the firms - so that there are 10 separate investments in total - and then 
examine how firm productivity, size and other characteristics influence the average 
investment decision; or (ii) they pool the investments of each firm and investigate how 
firm characteristics affect a firm’s total number of investments (or the total amount of 
capital invested). Both approaches ignore information that is potentially very valuable in 
understanding FDI decisions. First, pooling the data implies that one cannot distinguish 
between how firm characteristics affect the likelihood of making a first investment and 
how they affect the likelihood of subsequent investments (and thus the investment total). 
Second, these studies disregard the inter-temporal nature of investment decisions. For 
instance, they do not take into account the option value of waiting to make an irreversible 
investment until the firm has learned more about demand and other host-country factors, 
or that firms may learn from earlier investments about the likely profitability of 
subsequent investments. Third, they fail to take into account possible interdependencies 
between the investments of a given firm, since they effectively treat each firm as a single-
product/single-plant firm. But like probably most multinational firms, the ones in our 
Japanese sample typically have multiple product lines, and most likely multiple products 
within each line. 
In the current paper we separate a firm’s investment total into a sequence of 
individual investment decisions, and analyze how firm-specific characteristics affect the 
investment likelihood at each stage. In particular, we distinguish between those firm-
specific characteristics that determine a firm’s initial decision to invest and those 
influencing the firm’s subsequent investments. We avoid sampling bias by including both 
investing and non-investing firms in our sample. Empirical analysis is through the 
proportional hazard model that focuses on the duration between events (investments),   3
thus allowing us to focus on investment timing.  The hazard model’s temporal dimension 
allows a firm’s time-varying characteristics (e.g., productivity, size) to be continually 
updated throughout the investment sequence.  This will lead to increased estimation 
efficiency as compared to the (typically employed) empirical tests that use a single data 
point for each variable included in their analysis, while also allowing each individual 
stage of the investment sequence to be examined separately (see Cameron and Trivedi 
1998: 8).  
Estimation results indicate that total factor productivity is a significant 
determinant of FDI at each stage of the investment process: the more productive a firm is 
the more likely it is to undertake an investment and the shorter is the duration between 
investments. Firm size, by contrast, only matters for later stages, which simply means 
that large firms on average undertake more investment projects. These results are related 
in two ways to the previous literature.
2 First, they shed light on the “threshold effect” 
found in previous studies. Blomström and Lipsey (1991), for instance, find that only 
firms exceeding a certain critical size engage in FDI, whereas studies along the line of 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) suggest that only firms exceeding a critical level of 
productivity choose FDI. Specifically, we find such an effect only for productivity. 
Second, Blomström and Lipsey (1991) argue that firm size has no effect on the extent of 
a firm’s investment, whereas papers on the role of productivity implicitly treat firms as 
single-product firms and thus have nothing at all to say about the extent of a firm’s 
investment. Our paper shows that larger and more productive firms tend to have more 
investments.  
We also obtain different results than earlier papers when we consider the effect of 
keiretsu membership on FDI.  Specifically we find that keiretsu membership only 
significantly impacts investment at later investment stages. This means that keiretsu firms 
are not more likely than other firms to have a foreign manufacturing affiliate, they simply 
have more of them on average. By contrast, most of the theoretical and empirical papers 
                                                 
2 In addition to the papers already cited above, one should mention Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) who find 
that firm specific determinants of the entry-mode choice (wholly owned vs. joint venture) change over the 
investment sequence. Drake and Caves (1992) examine how the determinants of aggregate FDI flows 
change over time.   4
in this literature find that keiretsu membership raises the likelihood of investment.
3 Like 
in the case of firm size, the difference between our results and those of previous papers 
may be explained by the fact that we do not pool the FDI data: if we do pool that data, we 
arrive at the same conclusion as previous papers, namely that productivity, size and 
keiretsu membership all matter for the FDI decision. 
This paper continues as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical 
framework, including our own model and a discussion of related theory papers. Section 3 
contains the predictions. Section 4 describes the FDI data and the choice of control 
variables. Section 5 provides the empirical models, and Section 6 the estimation results. 
Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs and data sources. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section we set up a model of a multi-product, multi-plant firm that exports various 
goods to a host country and has to decide whether and at what time to switch to supplying 
a good locally by setting up a production facility in the foreign country.
4 Consider a firm 
based in the home country (h) that manufactures differentiated goods in the production 
facilities that it has established there. We refer to this firm as firm h. It sells these goods 
at home and initially also exports them to the foreign country (f). Foreign demand grows 
at an exogenously given rate, and the firm has to decide whether and at what time to 
switch from exporting a good to producing it locally in the foreign country. The direct 
trade-off between exporting and FDI is the usual proximity-concentration trade-off: the 
firm saves transportation costs but incurs a sunk cost of setting up a new plant. We want 
to know how this trade-off and therefore the timing of investment projects is affected by 
(i) the firm’s productivity, (ii) the number of goods it produces, (iii) the number of 
                                                 
3 For example, see recent empirical studies by Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Head, Ries, and Swenson 
(1999), and Blonigen, Ellis, and Fausten (2005). 
4 Various aspects of this decision problem have already been examined elsewhere. In Rob and Vettas 
(2003), for example, a single-product firm faces growing but uncertain demand in the foreign country and 
has to decide whether and at what time to invest abroad to install production capacity. They show that 
demand uncertainty tends to delay FDI. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) have a model, again of a single-
product firm, in which demand is growing at a fixed rate but the firm faces potential entry from local rivals. 
Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) examine the exporting-versus-FDI decision from the point of view of a 
multi-product firm, but do so in a static framework. 
   5
investments it has already undertaken, (iv) the degree of substitutability/complementarity 
among its products, and (v) the number of local competitors, i.e., market concentration.   
To focus attention on firm h’s investment decision, we assume that the markets in 
h and f are segmented, i.e., that there is no consumer arbitrage, and we let marginal 
production costs be constant. This implies that all FDI decisions are determined solely by 
the market equilibrium in country f. Firm h produces n goods, and sells quantities 
n x x , , 1 K in country f. The foreign market is also served by m foreign rivals. We think of 
these rivals as being “small” firms, where each produces only a single good for the local 
market. We denote their outputs by  m y y , , 1 K . The number of identical foreign consumers 
at time t is denoted by N(t). Consumers base their demand for a good i at time t only on 
the price at t, pi(t). Assuming quadratic, quasi-linear preferences, the inverse demand at 
time t for a good i produced by firm h is: 
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where a > 0, b > 0, d and e are time-invariant demand parameters. Parameter d measures 
the degree of substitutability between firm h’s products. If d=1, they are perfect 
substitutes; if 0<d<1, they are imperfect substitutes; if d=0, demands are independent of 
each other; and if d<0, they are complements. Parameter e measures the degree of 
substitutability between firm h’s products and those of its rivals. We assume that the local 
firms’ products are imperfect substitutes for those of firm h, i.e., 0<e<1, but perfect 
substitutes for each other. The demand for a good l produced by a local firm hence is: 

















k l t x e t y
t N
b
a t p       (2) 
When producing good i in country j=h,f, firm h incurs a marginal cost of 
i j ij w c θ − = , where wj denotes the country-j wage rate and  i θ  is a productivity parameter 
specific to good i. On each unit that firm h exports to country f it incurs shipping costs of 
s. We assume that the sunk cost of building a plant in the foreign country is G; this cost 
has to be incurred for each product. The local firms in country f have a marginal cost of 
wf. 
Firms maximize the present value of their profits and are able to borrow at a 
constant rate r to cover sunk costs. They engage in Cournot competition. We assume that   6
at time t=0 cost and demand conditions are such that firm h can profitably export all n 
goods to the foreign market in equilibrium; demand is too small to support a subsidiary in 
country f. Over time, the number of consumers in f and hence demand grows at a fixed 
rate. We see this assumption as a convenient shortcut to represent the more realistic 
scenario where demand increases come in spurts due to economic growth in Europe and 




In this section, we characterize the investment strategies predicted by the model; first-
order conditions and formal proofs of the results are provided in Appendix I. Two 
preliminary results help us in deriving the predictions. First, for a given investment 
strategy, per-capita output and profits in Cournot equilibrium are independent of t. This is 
simply a consequence of three assumptions, namely that consumers base their decision on 
current prices, that demand is linear, and that the marginal cost is constant.  
  Second, if , s c w ih f + <  then providing any given product i through FDI yields 
firm h a bigger profit, gross of the sunk cost of investment, than if it exported the product. 
This is due to the direct effect of having a lower variable cost and to the additional, 
strategic effect of gaining market share vis-à-vis local competitors. 
  Together, these preliminary results imply that as the market grows over time firm 
h will switch from exporting to FDI. More precisely, there exists a time t1 at which the 
firm will switch to FDI in one good, since demand has grown large enough to 
compensate for the sunk cost associated with FDI. There also exists a time t2>t1 at which 
the firm will undertake a second investment, and so on.  
We can now examine the influence of the time-invariant parameters on t1 and t2. 
The impact of country- and industry-specific variables is the same as in the standard 
proximity-concentration models. An increase in per-capita demand makes it more 
attractive to save transportation costs by engaging in FDI. Higher home relative to 
foreign wages, higher transportation costs and lower sunk costs of establishing a   7
subsidiary also make FDI more profitable and hence reduce the time to investment. The 
number of foreign competitors, i.e., industry concentration, has an ambiguous effect.
5 
Firm-specific characteristics have the following effects. The greater is firm h’s 
productivity, the bigger is the firm’s market share and hence the more profitable is FDI 
and the shorter is the time to investment at each stage. The size of a firm in our model 
also depends on the number of goods it produces. This number has an ambiguous effect 
on the FDI decision, since the effect depends on the degree of substitutability or 
complementarity between goods. However, we can prove that if firm h’s goods are 
imperfect substitutes, t2 will be delayed due to a cannibalization effect, i.e., the fact that 
the second product will take market share away from the first product. In particular,  
Suppose that 1>d>e>0 so that firm h’s products are imperfect substitutes, but better 
substitutes for each other than for the goods produced by local firms. Then, ceteris 
paribus, the time to the first investment is shorter than the time between the first and 
second investment.  
An important consideration of the investment timing decision that we did not 
analyze in our model is demand uncertainty. However, Rob and Vettas (2003) provide 
clear predictions about the effect of demand uncertainty that we can use almost directly 
for our empirical analysis. Since uncertainty about demand (and other relevant host 
country parameters) tends to delay FDI and since a firm’s estimates of these parameters 
are likely to improve as it gains investment experience, we would expect later 
investments, ceteris paribus, to be made more quickly than a first investment. We can test 
this prediction directly using a Kaplan-Meier test; more on this later. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our sample consists of the investments of 286 Japanese manufacturing firms.
 6 Inclusion 
into the sample was dependent upon meeting the following criteria: availability of firm-
                                                 
5 If all products were homogeneous and marginal costs were identical across firms, the effect of a greater 
number of foreign firms clearly would be to reduce the attractiveness of FDI. The ambiguity hence comes 
from the different degrees of substitutability/complementarity between goods and cost heterogeneity. 
6 See the Appendix II for details on data collection.   8
specific data for the entire sample period (1970-1994),
 7 and for the firm's entire 
European manufacturing FDI to occur after 1969. The choice of this time period (1970-
94) follows the Japanese government’s initial deregulation of outward Japanese FDI in 
1969.
8 This time period also allows us to avoid the impact of the Asian financial crisis on 
outward FDI as well as the number of mergers/acquisition between Japanese firms in the 
late 1990s that would have significantly decreased the number of firms in the sample.
9 
Once selected, investments in which the firm's shareholding stake is below 10% 
were eliminated from the firm's investment history. Of the 286 firms, each of which is 
listed on one of the Japanese stock exchanges, 176 firms established manufacturing 
affiliates in Europe, 103 had only non-manufacturing FDI, and 7 firms did not establish 
any European affiliate during this period.  184 firms were keiretsu members. 
The sample contains a total of 372 manufacturing investments with 269 (72%) of 
these investments made by keiretsu members. While the average date of initial 
manufacturing investment is earlier for keiretsu members (1983) than for non-members 
(1985), pre-1986 manufacturing investments as a percentage of a firm’s investment total 
does not vary significantly according to keiretsu affiliation. Also, 57% of all Japanese 
MNEs that ultimately invested in Europe by 1994 had already done so by 1985, 
indicating that much of the Japanese investment into Europe between 1985-1994 was 
from experienced investors and not from firms new to the European market. Finally, 
keiretsu membership does appear to affect the number of investments, as members 
established on average 2.2 affiliates, slightly more than the 1.79 affiliates for non-
members. 
There are several methods to examine the duration between investments.  There is 
an average duration of 4.5 for the establishment of a second affiliate, and 4 years for the 
                                                 
7 Hazard models are quite data intensive as they require data from each period (year) in the sample, in 
contrast to other typically used models (e.g., logit, probit) that require just a single data point for each 
observation, whether it be contemporaneous or lagged data, or an average across the sample period. Thus, 
only firms with complete data are included in our sample. 
8 Pre-1970 investment was quite limited, in part by the 1949 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law that essentially required Japanese government approval of all foreign direct investment until 
deregulation began in 1969. See Mason (1994) for more details.  By 1994, investment into European 
manufacturing affiliates by the sample firms had fallen to 1973-levels. 
9 The reorganization of Japanese multinationals in the late 1990s was also due to European integration and 
new investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe.    9
establishment of a third, if all (including right-censored) durations are considered.
10  For 
the same investment spells, the average duration rises to 5.2 (4.2) years if only those 
durations between established affiliates is considered; the rise is a result of the large 
fraction of single- and double-affiliate investors that invested late in the sample, creating 
numerous short (right-censored) second and third duration spells. If we account for the 
year of the firm’s initial investment, we find that duration spells have fallen since the 
1970s; for instance, the average duration between first-second investment and second-
third investments fell from 7.9 (5.9) years for firms initially investing between 1970-1974 
to 3.0 (1.5) for those investors initially entering between 1985-1989.  While this does 
suggest a “catch-up” by late-investing firms, we are most concerned with the general 
result (as illustrated in the Kaplan-Meier plots) that subsequent investments, regardless of 
duration measure, occur more rapidly than the previous investments. 
Our model suggests that we should include two categories of explanatory 
variables: firm-specific characteristics, and country- and industry-specific controls. Here 
is how we proxy for them. 
 
4.1 Firm-Specific Characteristics 
 
According to the model, a firm’s productivity and size play an important role in its 
investment strategy. Data availability allows us to measure a firm’s total factor 
productivity (TFP) via the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method. Our model suggests that the 
greater is the firm’s productivity, the shorter is the time to investment at each stage.  
A firm’s total assets (in billions of 1993¥) are included as a measure of firm size 
(Size). The data is lagged by one year to eliminate possible endogeneity and to account 
for the potential time lag between the investment decision and the actual investment that 
shows up in our database. Size is positively correlated with TFP, as indicated by the 
model; but the correlation is only moderate: 0.261 (see Table 2). An alternative measure 
of firm size is the parent employment levels (Employ). This measure is highly correlated 
with Size (correlation coefficient: 0.654), and we hence use it only for robustness checks. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
10 While certainly possible, our dataset includes no firms that simultaneously establish multiple affiliates.   10
A firm’s size also can also be measured through the range of products it produces. 
While the data for the Japanese firms that comprise our sample does not indicate an exact 
number of product lines and we do not know the degree of complementarity among these 
lines, we are able to determine the percentage of sales disaggregated by the firm’s major 
business lines or specific corporate branches. In most cases, this information is available 
at the 2- or 3-digit SIC level. We use this sales data to create a firm-specific Hirschmann-
Herfindahl Index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squared sales percentages for each 
business line listed for the firm by the dataset. The index values range from 0 to 10,000, 
with larger values indicating a less diversified corporation in terms of its sales 
breakdown.  Note that the HHI is positively, but moderately correlated with both Size and 
TFP. No a priori prediction can be made on the HHI index’s effect on FDI, given the 
unknown degree of complementarity between product lines. 
In addition to the HHI index, we also evaluate possible cannibalization or 
complementarity between products by identifying the affiliate’s main business line. We 
create the variable Diversification to measure the degree of diversification in the parent’s 
investment strategy. For each affiliate established by a Japanese parent, Diversification 
takes the value of 1 if it is established in an industry different from those previously 
established, and 0 if the affiliate is in the same industry as a previously established 
affiliate. For the first manufacturing affiliate established by each firm, a 1 is given if the 
affiliate's main business line differs from the parent's core business line, and 0 if it is the 
same. Determination of the affiliate's main business line occurs at the 3-digit SIC level. 
In the model section, we assume for simplicity that all of the firm’s products are 
initially exported. Obviously this is not the case in practice, where the firm will export 
only those goods that it can manufacture at a high enough level of productivity to be able 
to compete with local producers of substitute goods and to justify the transportation costs 
(and possible additional fixed exporting costs that we do not model). Hence the firm’s 
annual export share (Exprt), computed as the ratio of export sales to total sales in a given 
fiscal year, should also be an indicator of the firm’s productivity and competitiveness.
11 
Exprt and TFP are indeed positively correlated as indicated by Table 2. Annual R&D 
intensity (R&D) is measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales for the fiscal 
                                                 
11 Note that actual exports to Europe are not available at the firm level.     11
year. It constitutes another indicator of the firm’s productivity and ability to compete with 
local rivals.
12  Exprt and R&D are lagged by one year to account for possible 
endogeneity. Both Exprt and R&D should have a positive influence on the likelihood of 
FDI at each point in time. 
Next, we also want to account for the obvious fact – not dealt with in the model –  
that a firm may gain knowledge or experience from investment projects that is useful for 
subsequent projects. For each firm, the number of previously established European 
manufacturing affiliates (PrevManufInvst) is determined at the time of each investment. 
Use of this PrevManufInvest alone limits investment history heterogeneity to differences 
in previous investment totals. As a result, we also include the size of the firm's European 
distribution and service network (PrevNonManufInvst) that is determined by the count of 
all previously established non-manufacturing European affiliates at the time each 
manufacturing affiliate is established. The establishment of a distribution network 
typically precedes investment into manufacturing. While this may lengthen the time to a 
manufacturing investment, e.g., if managerial or financial resources are scarce, having an 
established distribution network may also be helpful in establishing a manufacturing 
affiliate, e.g., because it provides information and contacts with customers. We also 
include the length of the firm's previous manufacturing investment spell (PrevDuration) 
to control for previous investment timing. This variable allows for firms with similar 
investment totals to have different previous investment experiences based on when the 
previous investments occurred. 
A caveat for our analysis is that we do not control for the fact that firms in our 
sample may invest not only in Europe, but also in North America and East Asia. If these 
firms require time to digest these (unobserved) investments and recover their financial 
position, this should be reflected in the durations between investments. 
 
4.2 Additional Controls 
 
We control for industry-specific influences using industry affiliation dummies created for 
each investing parent at its 2-digit SIC code. With regard to country-level influences note 
that in our empirical analysis we treat Europe as a single country, controlling for changes 
                                                 
12 Firms’ 1986 R&D expenditures are used for the years prior to 1986 when R&D expenditure data was not 
available. See Padmanahban and Cho (1996).   12
in country-level influences over time with a time dummy and by including European 
GDP (EuropeanGDP), measured in constant US dollars.
13  
Since we are dealing with Japanese FDI, we have to control for the existence of 
“horizontal” and “vertical” keiretsu. Membership in such a keiretsu is believed to 
increase FDI likelihood as compared to non-members and non-Japanese MNEs with 
similar firm-specific characteristics. Keiretsu affiliation and the firm's inclination toward 
its particular keiretsu are located in various editions of Dodwell Marketing's Industrial 
Groupings in Japan.
14  For the purposes of this study, the dummy variable 
KeiretsuMember takes a value of 1 if the firm is keiretsu member, with the dummy 
variables HorizontalKeiretsuMember and VerticalKeiretsuMember taking the value 1 if 
the firm is affiliated with a horizontal or vertical keiretsu, respectively. Note that we do 
not use all three variables in the same regression; rather we will use KeiretsuMember in 
most regressions, and on occasion use the HorizontalKeiretsuMember/ 
VerticalKeiretsuMember pair. All three variables are expected to have a positive affect on 
a firm's propensity for investment. In addition, we will interact the membership dummy 
variables with Size and TFP to measure size and TFP differentials between keiretsu 
members and non-members. 
Finally, we control for three measures of the firm’s financial health:  
GrossRevenue, calculated as the firm’s gross revenue divided by its total assets; 
InterestBurden, calculated as its interest payments divided by gross revenue; and 
CashFlow, which is a measure of its post-tax profits plus depreciation divided by gross 
revenue. A priori, we expect GrossRevenue and CashFlow to positively influence 
investment likelihood, while a higher InterestBurden should negatively affect investment 
likelihood.  
 
                                                 
13 Since Japanese affiliates in Europe often serve the entire European market, we do not consider the 
question of where in Europe a firm may chose to invest. To address this question properly we would have 
to estimate multiple hazard models, one for each potential host country.  
14 The Dodwell keiretsu classification system is chosen over other systems because it applies the most rigid 
standards to group affiliation.  See Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, note 10 (1996).   13
5. Econometric Estimation 
5.1. Kaplan-Meier Estimation 
 
The first prediction we want to test is that uncertainty about demand (and other relevant 
host-country parameters) tends to delay FDI and that, as a firm’s estimates of these 
parameters improve with experience, later investments are made more quickly than the 
first investment (see Rob and Vettas, 2003). We can test this prediction using a Kaplan-
Meier test. To do so, note that in a repeated investment model, an observation is defined 
as a distinct time spell until an investment occurs. For firms with multiple investments, 
individual spells are recorded for each investment. For example, a firm establishing two 
manufacturing affiliates in 1982 and 1991, respectively, generates three spells, the third 
of which (1992-1994) is right-censored. A single right-censored spell of 25 years is 
created for firms without a manufacturing affiliate.  Left-censoring is not a consideration, 
as none of the sample firms established a European manufacturing affiliate prior to 1970.   
Following Kiefer (1988), let T be a random variable that measures the duration 
between spells with the probability distribution F(t)=Pr(T<t) and corresponding density 
function f(t). The survivor function, or the probability that the duration between 
investments survives beyond time t is defined as S(t)=1-F(t)=Pr(T≥t).  In addition, the 
duration between investments can be characterized by the hazard function λ(t)=f(t)/S(t).  
λ(t), the conditional probability that investment occurs shortly after t, given that 
investment has not taken place at time t, is precisely defined as 
t)/h T | h t T Pr(t   lim (t)
0 ≥ + ≤ ≤ =
→ h λ   (3). 
The shape of λ(t) indicates duration dependence. Positive duration dependence, 
dλ(t)/dt>0, indicates that the probability that an investment will occur increases with 
spell length, while dλ(t)/dt<0 indicates negative duration dependence. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 plots the Kaplan-Meier hazard function estimates of (3) by position in the 
investment sequence, where each curve corresponds to an individual investment spell. 
Note that each individual-stage hazard function displays positive duration dependence, 
indicating that at no time during the investment process do firms cross a threshold upon   14
which FDI likelihood decreases.
15  However, this desire for new investment is not 
uniform across location in the investment sequence.  A Mantel-Cox log-rank test for 
hazard function equality reveals significant differences among hazard rates at each 
investment stage, indicating that investment likelihood increases over the firm’s FDI 
sequence, as we expected.   
 
5.2. Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 
Although the Kaplan-Meier results indicate differences in investment likelihood across 
individual investment stages, these results do not allow us to examine how firm-specific 
factors affect investment likelihood at each stage. For this purpose, we apply a Cox 
(1972) proportional hazard model. A semi-parametric partial likelihood model, the Cox 
model allows us to model the effects of the explanatory variables parametrically, while 
not requiring a parametric functional form for duration dependence. For this reason, as 
well as for the ability to include and update values for each time-varying covariate, the 
Cox model is preferred to fully parametric specifications. 
The Cox model can be formulated as 
(t)) x (t)exp( (t) i o i β λ λ ′ =   (4) 
where xi(t) represents a vector of the i
th firm's covariates at time t, assumed to capture the 
effect of the firm-specific characteristics that influence investment likelihood.  λo(t) is the 
“baseline” hazard function (with unknown parametric form); it takes the interpretation as 
the hazard rate for the respective firm when all independent covariates are set to 0. λi(t) is 
the proportion of λo(t) determined by the effects of the firm-specific explanatory 
variables.  We assume a multiplicative relationship between the covariates and the 
baseline hazard; in effect, each explanatory covariate affects the baseline hazard 
proportional to its effect on FDI likelihood. Firm-specific characteristics that positively 
influence investment are associated with higher investment hazards, which correspond to 
greater investment likelihood, whereas variables that negatively influence investment 
likelihood yield lower investment hazards. As we report our coefficient estimates via a 
                                                 
15 In the FDI literature, Kaplan-Meier tests have often been used to examine the survivor function S(t) of 
newly established firms, finding that survival rates decline as the firm ages. In contrast, we focus on the 
opposite case, or the likelihood of establishing a new firm, and thus produce a figure (Figure 1) opposite of 
that found in the firm survival literature.   15
hazard ratio,
16 variables that positively (negatively) affect investment produce hazard 
ratios greater than (less than) 1.    
Finally, as the Cox model is a continuous model while the investment data and 
explanatory variables are measured discretely, ties in spell duration length may occur. 
Breslow’s (1974) approximation is employed to account for such occurrences. 
    The underlying assumption of the study is that initial investment spells begin in 
1970. Initial firm- and macro-level characteristics are set to 1970 values, although they 
may be functions of prior values and may hence not truly be “initial.” However, the 
initial conditions bias suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) is avoided as strict 
restrictions on Japanese FDI in manufacturing existed prior to the Japanese government's 
1969's five-stage deregulation of outward FDI controls (Mason, 1994).  Therefore, the 
earliest most firms could establish foreign manufacturing affiliates was 1969, for which 
their 1970 firm-specific covariate values serve as good approximations. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
 
Estimation results (Tables 3-5) are provided to indicate how firm-specific characteristics 
affect both the likelihood of initial investment as well the likelihood of subsequent 
investment.  
 
6.1 Pooled Investment Estimation 
 
Table 3 provides estimates for the sample firms’ pooled investment histories. While 
regressions based on pooled investment data are typically used to determine how firm-
specific characteristics affect a firm’s foreign investment, here they are provided only to 
compare the overall fit of the data in relation to previous studies.  In Tables 4-5, the first 
three investment stages (1
st, 2
nd, and 3
rd investment) are examined separately to indicate 
how the firm’s characteristics affect investment at each stage.  For both the pooled and 
individual stage regressions, two separate specifications are examined: the first uses 
KeiretsuMember to differentiate between keiretsu and non-keiretsu members, while the 
second employs VerticalKeiretsuMember and HorizontalKeiretsuMember to distinguish 
                                                 
16 Hazard ratios are determined as the exponentiated linear prediction, or exp(xβ).   16
between non-keiretsu members and those who are members of vertically-oriented or 
horizontally-organized keiretsu.  
Table 3 reveals several important results.  Firm size has the predicted positive and 
significant influence on investment, regardless of whether we control for Size alone 
(column 1), or Size with TFP (columns 3-5).  From the keiretsu-size interactive dummy 
variable (column 4), which measures size differentials between keiretsu members and 
non-members, the impact of size on investment appears similar regardless of keiretsu 
membership status.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We also find that a firm’s Levinsohn-Petrin TFP measure positively and 
significantly affects its investment likelihood. In column (2) we include TFP without also 
controlling for firm size, while in columns (3) – (5) we control for both Size and TFP. In 
each case, both TFP and Size’s influence on investment likelihood remain, even with the 
positive correlation between the two variables.  
In regard to the other firm specific variables, the HHI coefficient is significantly 
less than 1 across all specifications, indicating its negative relationship with investment 
likelihood. This suggests that a greater concentration in firm sales leads to less FDI 
possibly due to worries about cannibalization effects. A cannibalization effect may also 
be underlying the Diversification variable coefficient estimate, which reveals that a firm’s 
future investment is more likely to come in an industry different than in previous 
investments.  
Firms’ R&D intensities and export ratios have a significant and positive affect on 
FDI.  The hazard ratio for previous manufacturing experience (PrevManufInvst) is 
significantly greater than 1, indicating that the number of previous manufacturing 
investments greatly increases the firm’s future investment likelihood. Just as importantly, 
the coefficient on the PrevNonManufInvst is significantly less than 1, indicating that 
investment into wholesale/retail affiliates tends to push off investment into 
manufacturing.
17 
Keiretsu membership is shown in columns (1) - (4) to be a significant influence in 
the pooled investment sample, regardless of the firm size/productivity measures 
                                                 
17 Note that while we also control for European GDP as a measure of demand, it is never a statistically 
significant investment influence.   17
employed, suggesting that group members gain from at least one of the aforementioned 
keiretsu investment “benefits”. As indicated in column (5), both horizontal and vertical 
keiretsu membership increases investment likelihood, with the marginal impact of 
vertical membership greater than that of horizontal membership. Finally, the firm’s debt 
interest burden and cash flow had only slight impacts on the investment decision.  
We conclude from Table 3 that the predictions of our model appear to match up 
well with the data. In cases where we expected positive influences on investment, the 
data support our conclusions. Where we had no a priori expectations, such as in the case 
of the firm’s Hirschann-Herfindahl sales index, the results are consistent with the 
presence of a cannibalization effect. Moreover, using pooled data we are able to 
reproduce the literature’s standard findings on how firm size, productivity and keiretsu 
membership affect FDI.  
Of course, we did not select the hazard model to analyze pooled data, but rather 
because it allows us to examine individual investment steps. The results for the individual 
investment stages are presented next. 
 
6.2. Individual Spell Regressions 
 
Viewing each investment decision separately allows us to tell exactly when in the 
investment process the explanatory variables generate their influence.  In a repeated spell 
specification firms' investment histories are partitioned by investment (first, second, 
third,…); we choose to focus on the first three individual stages, as they account for the 
complete investment history for 92% of our sample firms. Each stage is examined 
separately under the assumption of weak exogeneity between investment stages, so 
influences on the first investment can be viewed separately from those on subsequent 
investments.
18  
Separate analysis of each investment stage requires that the unobserved 
heterogeneity associated with previous stages be taken into account. Inclusion of 
variables that measure past history (PrevManufInvest, PrevNonManufInvest) in each 
regression satisfies this requirement. Table 4 displays the results of Cox regression 
analysis of the first investment stage, which indicates the stage at which the firm first 
                                                 
18 See Ross (1996) for justification of this approach.   18
becomes a manufacturing MNE in Europe, while Table 5 displays the estimation results 
for the second and third individual stage, which represent the firm’s expansion of its 
European manufacturing network. Note that at each stage, PrevManufInvst drops out of 
the regression, as it is the same for all firms.  
[Insert Tables 4-5 about here] 
Combining the results from Tables 4-5, several of the strongly significant FDI 
influences from the pooled regression do not retain their significance at each individual 
investment stage. For instance, it appears that the “hurdle” of establishing a 
manufacturing presence in Europe is not associated with a firm’s size, as in the first 
investment decision Size is shown to be an insignificant influence on investment. It is 
only later, at the third investment stage, that firm size becomes an important investment 
determinant. This suggests that larger firms tend to have more investments than smaller 
firms, but are not more likely to become multinational firms.  In contrast, TFP is shown 
to be a highly significant investment influence at each investment stage, including the 
first stage, indicating that productivity levels tend to increase investment likelihood 
throughout the investment sequence. Thus, while it is not the case that all firms have at 
least one investment (recall that in our dataset, only roughly two-thirds of the firms have 
manufacturing investments), these results suggest a high degree of Size and TFP 
heterogeneity among firms with at least one manufacturing investment. On the other 
hand, however, it appears that only the largest and most productive firms have larger 
manufacturing networks, and that smaller, less productive firms have not established such 
systems. 
A firm’s status with regard to keiretsu membership appears not to play a role in 
the decision to start manufacturing operations in Europe.  With keiretsu membership not 
a significant FDI influence at the first and second investment stages, but rather only a 
significant FDI determinant at the third investment stage, membership appears to have no 
role in the firm’s initial investment decision. This would suggest that keiretsu members 
and non-members are equally likely to become MNEs, a result on the surface to 
contradict most previous empirical studies on the keiretsu-investment link. However, 
recall that most of these studies found the keiretsu-investment link using pooled 
investment data. This is exactly what we found in Table 3. However, by using the hazard 
model, this study is able to isolate the result that it appears that keiretsu members are   19
simply more likely to have more investments.  As a result, the keiretsu traits of 
informational exchanges, cross-ownership of stock, and eased capital market restrictions 
associated with firms’ association with member banks, do not appear to have a significant 
effect on the decision to initially establish a manufacturing affiliate in Europe, but rather, 
membership appears to be mostly associated with increased investment totals.  This 
indicates that the “credit channel” benefit of membership may not pertain to the ability to 
become a MNE, but rather the ability to expand holdings abroad.
19   
Similarly, a firm’s HHI index, while a significant investment deterrent in the 
pooled investment sample, does not affect a firm’s initial or second investment decision. 
Much like Size and KeiretsuMember, HHI only plays a significant role for the firm’s third 
investment. There HHI has a negative effect. In contrast, Diversification affects all stages 
of the firm’s investment sequence. Hence large firms with diversified product lines are 
the ones most likely to set up several affiliates abroad.  
Similar to the TFP result, it appears that the hurdle of becoming a MNE may be 
better overcome by firms that are active in export markets and invest heavily in R&D. 
Both a firm’s export ratio (Exprt) and R&D intensity are strongly significant determinants 
of initial investment. In the case of R&D, while it has a highly significant (p<0.01) affect 
on initial investment, its significance in impacting FDI declines at each investment stage, 
and by the firm’s third stage, it no longer affects the investment decision. 
We also find that previous investment into non-manufacturing, highly significant 
in the pooled investment regressions, significantly reduces the likelihood of initial 
investment, which suggests that firms choose to enter foreign markets through 
wholesale/retail affiliates as stepping stones to subsequent local production.  However, 
once the firm has committed to producing abroad, the role of PrevNonManInvst 
diminishes as expected, and PrevNonManInvst does not impact subsequent investment 
decisions. Finally, the firm’s financial health had little impact on the decision to become 
a MNE. InterestBurden and CashFlow only marginally affect the first and second-stage 
decisions, with none of the three variables impacting the third investment stage. 
                                                 
19 Results not shown here also indicate vertical keiretsu members are more likely to have three investments 
as compared to horizontally affiliated members. We also find that, using a keiretsu-size interactive dummy 
variable, keiretsu firms with three investments were much smaller than non-members with similar 
investment totals, which suggests that member firms may indeed be following the group’s main (and 
larger) firm abroad.   20
Altogether these results suggest that firm-specific influences change over the 
investment sequence, and that these changes would not be recognized in a pooled 
investment history framework. Interestingly, Size and TFP have different impacts on 
investment over the entire sequence, suggesting that it is productivity, and not asset 




6.3 Robustness Check and Multiple-Investor Regressions 
 
We conduct several checks on the robustness of these results. First, in regressions not 
reported here, we replaced Size with parent employment levels (Employ), and found 
similar results. This is not surprising given the relatively high pair-wise correlation 
between the two variables of 0.654 (Table 2).  Next, we take the natural log of each of the 
firm-specific characteristics (excluding keiretsu membership) and perform similar 
regressions to those indicated in Tables 3. With one exception, our original results hold; 
the exception is in the HHI index, which in most specifications now carried coefficients 
of around 0.642, representing a much more highly significant negative influence on 
investment likelihood than in the previous specifications. 
Finally, one may look at the regression results from the individual stages and 
wonder if our results are being generated by firms leaving the sample at each stage. That 
is, firms in the sample for the second investment stage regressions (Table 5, columns (1)-
(3)) have made one previous manufacturing investment, while firms in the “Third 
Investments” sample (Table 5, columns (4)-(6)) have established two previous 
manufacturing investments. As a result, firms with only one established manufacturing 
affiliate at the end of our sample are not included in the regression analysis of this stage.  
Could it be that, by realizing a change in the sample firms as we proceed through 
the investment stages, we are biasing our results? To check this, we restrict the sample to 
those firms that establish at least 3 manufacturing investments, and re-run the Cox 
                                                 
20 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting an alternative interpretation of the results, based on the notion 
that TFP represents a short-run characteristic of the firm – in the sense that it fluctuates in the short run – , 
whereas size, keiretsu membership and HHI represent long-run determinants. TFP may then reflect the 
short-run affordability of each investment project, whereas the long-run determinants indicate a firm’s 
ability to carry out multiple investments.    21
regressions at each investment stage. Our results, reported in Table 6 for the firms’ 
pooled, first, and second investment stages,
21 generally support our findings from our 
previous estimation that saw firms leave the sample at different investment decision 
stages. With this restricted sample, we find that keiretsu membership, firm size, and the 
HHI index all do not affect the firm’s initial investment decision, even though in the 
pooled investment regressions they are found to be highly significant determinants. 
Similar to the full sample regressions, we see that TFP is significant for both the pooled 
sample as well as in each individual stage. We also find that previous non-manufacturing 
investments increase the time to first investment (decreased investment likelihood), while 
having no statistically significant impact on subsequent investments. Thus, it appears that 
our results are robust to the changing dataset as we move through the investment 
sequence, and the full sample results are not generated by firms simply leaving the 
sample as their investment sequence ends. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Finally, concerns over multicollinearity typically arise when working with firm-
specific data, especially in regard to firm size, TFP, and exports. Although Table 1 
suggests low pair-wise correlation between these variables, and the inclusion of TFP and 
Size does not affect each variable’s coefficient estimates when included together in the 
regression analysis, we do wish to consider that there may be multicollinearity within the 
other group of firm specific variables. In Appendix Table 1, we sequentially add each 
firm specific variable into the model estimating the pooled investment data for the entire 
sample of firms. Analysis of these results suggests that there is no significant 




This paper examined how firm-specific characteristics affect a firm’s decision to 
establish an overseas affiliate and, thereafter, to expand its overseas operations.  The use 
of a hazard model allowed us to analyze each individual investment stage separately. This 
revealed that the determinants of investment decisions change over the investment 
                                                 
21 Third stage regression results are nearly identical to those found in Table 5, columns (4)-(6), since there 
is approximately the same number of firms in each sample; thus, we do not repeat these results here.   22
sequence. Specifically, we find that total factor productivity has a significant positive 
impact on the likelihood of investment at each stage, whereas firm size and keiretsu 
membership only become significant for later investments. In other words, the more 
productive a firm is, the greater is the probability that it undertakes an investment, no 
matter whether this is the first or a subsequent investment. Larger firms and keiretsu 
members, however, are no more likely to undertake an initial investment than smaller 
firms or firms without keiretsu ties. They simply have more foreign affiliates on average. 
The opposite effect is observed with respect to a firm’s R&D intensity, export ratio, and 
previous non-manufacturing FDI: they only significantly affect the firm’s initial 
investment. 
Our conclusions, specifically with regard to firm size and keiretsu membership, 
differ from those in the existing literature. We showed that this is likely to come from the 
fact that previous studies have pooled the investment data and thereby ignored 
information that is important for understanding the FDI decision. In particular, these 
studies cannot distinguish between factors that determine a firm’s investment total and 
those that affect the decision to set up an initial subsidiary. Strictly speaking, pooling the 
investment data is only justified if multinationals are single-product firms. But this is 
simply not the case in reality. By contrast, our approach and our results are fully 
consistent with a world in which multinationals are multi-product firms and where firm 
size is not only a function of productivity but also of the scope of the firm’s product 
range.  
   23
Appendix I: Proofs 
 
Each period, firm h chooses output to maximize ( ) , ) ( ) (
1 ∑ = − −
n
i i ij ij i t x s c t p λ where ) (t pi is 
given by (1) and the indicator variable  ij λ  equals 1 if good i is produced in country h and 
zero if it is produced in country f. The corresponding first-order condition for a product i 
is:  
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Similarly, by adding up all the m first-order conditions for the local firms in country f we 
obtain 













ma          (A.3) 
We can now solve (A.2) and (A.3) for the equilibrium values of X(t) and Y(t), and 
then use the following reformulation of (A.1) to derive firm h’s output of product i  
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It is straightforward to show that we can write  [ ] ) ( / ) ( ) ( ⋅ = X b t N t X  and 
[ ] ), ( / ) ( ) ( ⋅ = Y b t N t Y  and therefore also  [ ] ), ( / ) ( ) ( ⋅ = i i x b t N t x  where  ) (⋅  indicates 
dependence on the model’s time-invariant parameters. Moreover, the contribution of 
good i to firm h’s profit (gross of sunk costs) turns out to be  [ ]( ) . ) ( / ) ( ) (
2 ⋅ = i i x b t N t π  The 
total gross profit of firm h in period t thus is  [ ] ( ) ∑ = ⋅ = Π
n
i i x b t N t
1
2. ) ( / ) ( ) (  If n is large and 
the contribution of each good to firm h’s profit small, then the total profit is 
approximately  [ ]( ) . ) ( / ) ( ) (
2 ⋅ = Π X b t N t   
  Now consider firm h’s intertemporal investment problem. To determine the time 
t1 at which the firm will undertake its first investment, we have to compare the present 
value of exporting all n goods to the present value of producing one good locally and 
exporting the remaining  1 − n  goods. It is straightforward to establish that marginal 
changes in the time-invariant parameters that raise the Cournot equilibrium profit of 
producing one good locally and exporting the rest relative to the Cournot profit 
associated with exporting all goods imply an earlier t1. Hence to establish our results we 
have to carry out comparative static exercises on (A.2) to (A.4). 
Consider, for example, the effect of a marginal increase in firm h’s productivity 
(assuming equal productivity in each good). Using (A.2) and (A.3), we note that this 
raises the firm’s overall output ) (⋅ X  and lowers the total output of the local firms ). (⋅ Y  
However, the output of firm h rises by more, if it produces one good i in country f,   24
provided that  . s c w ih f + <  First, the lower variable cost associated with one FDI project 
implies a bigger gain in market share relative to the local firms. Second, the output of the 
good produced in f rises relative to the output of the other goods produced by firm h (see 
(A.4)), thus providing an additional efficiency gain. Hence an increase in productivity 
means that the firm will invest earlier. Similar comparative static effects can be derived 
for the other time-invariant parameters, including per-capita demand, wages, and industry 
concentration.  
To prove the result concerning the cannibalization effect, we need to compare the 
change in profit from (i) moving from one affiliate to two affiliates with the change in 
profit from (ii) moving from zero to one affiliate. Subtracting the change in profit of (ii) 
from that of (i), we obtain. 
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Note that for 1>d>e>0 this expression is strictly negative, which gives the desired result. 
 
Appendix II: Data Description 
•  Japanese FDI data was compiled from three separate volumes (1985, 1993, 1995) 
of Toyo Keizai Inc.'s Japanese Overseas Investment: A complete listing by firms 
and countries. 
•  A consistent determination of industry affiliation for the principal Japanese parent 
and the European affiliate requires the collection of each firm's primary 4-digit 
1987 U.S. Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code for the year of initial 
investment. SIC codes for the Japanese parents were found in Dun and 
Bradstreet's Principal International Businesses, National Register's Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations, and other publicly available sources. Numerous publicly 
available European sources provided the affiliates' codes. Since some of the 
European affiliates are too small to gain entry into corporate listings, the main 
offices of most national foreign investment agencies (e.g. Invest in Denmark 
Agency, Invest in Finland Bureau, Hungarian Trade Commission) provided 
information on affiliates' main business lines. Main business lines reported in 
earlier SIC revisions (1972, 1977) or in the European NACE format were 
converted to the 1987 SIC equivalent by standard classification concordances. 
•  Firm-specific characteristics (size, R&D, exports) are located in various issues of 
Toyo Keizai’s Japan Company Handbook as well as the Pacific Basic Capital 
Markets (PACAP) database. 
•  Data for IndExp is located in the OECD's International Trade by Commodities 
Statistics CD-ROM. Standard classification concordances are used to convert the 
data to 4-digit SIC. 
•  Countries in the sample include: EU-15, plus Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland 
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Table 1: Hypothetical Sample 
 
Investment Sequence  
1970________________________________________________________1994        
Firm 1                 1                                               2      3     4              
Firm 2                                                            1                
Firm 3                                 1           2                     
Firm 4                           1                    2                                                 3 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation between Major Firm-level Variables 
 
  TFP  Size  Export%  R&D  Keiretsu  HHI  Employ 
TFP  1.000             
Size  0.261  1.000           
Export%  0.258  0.173  1.000         
R&D  0.274  0.225  0.216  1.000       
Keiretsu  0.254  0.204  0.174  0.156  1.000     
HHI  0.236  0.345  0.011  0.055  0.152  1.000   
Employ  0.267  0.654  0.185  0.232  0.215  0.015  1.000 
 
   29
Table 3: Firm-Specific Investment Determinants for Pooled Investment Histories: All 
Firms 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Firm Size/Productivity            
Size  1.101
a  .  1.101
b  1.001
 b  1.101
a  1.101
a 
KeiretsuMember*Size  .  .  .  0.989  .   
TFP  .  1.131
a  1.131
 b   1.131
b   1.128
 b   1.098
 b  
KeiretsuMember*TFP  .  .  .  1.059
a  .   
             















Export Ratio (Exprt)  1.007
 b   1.005
 b   1.006
c   1.005
c   1.005
 c   1.005
c 










b   1.106
b   1.106
b   1.105
b  
PrevNonManufInvst  0.958  0.966
 c   0.956
c   0.956
c   0.956
c   0.957
c  
           
Keiretsu Membership           
KeiretsuMember  1.307
b   1.234
c  1.119
c   1.236
c   .  1.232
c  
VerticalKeiretsuMember  .  .  .  .  1.177
c   . 
HorizontalKeiretsuMember  .  .  .  .  1.121
c   . 
             
Financial Data             
Gross Revenue  .  .  .  .  .  1.047 
Interest Burden  .  .  .  .  .  0.963
c 
Cash Flow  .  .  .  .  .  1.029
c 
             
Industry Membership Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880 
Log-Likelihood  -1480.83  -1384.53  -1380.12  -1382.62  -1383.72  -1372.27 
Wald Test  138.84  138.44  140.15  147.97  148.01  156.10 
χ
2 test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. Significance Levels: 
a - p<0.01, 
b - p<0.05, 
c- p<0.10  30 
Table 4: Firm-Specific Investment Determinants for First Investments: All Firms 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Firm Size/Productivity                 
Size  1.000  .  1.000  .  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
KeiretsuMember*Size  .  .  .  .  .  0.999  .  . 
TFP  .  1.103






KeiretsuMember*TFP  .  .  .  .  .  1.042
b  .  . 
                 
Other Firm Characteristics                 
HHI  .  .  0.999  0.997  0.996  0.997  0.997  0.996 




























                 
Keiretsu Membership                 
KeiretsuMember  .  .  1.010  1.065  1.091  1.099  .  1.074 
VerticalKeiretsuMember  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.101  . 
HorizontalKeiretsuMember  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.121  . 
                 
Financial Data                 
Gross Revenue  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.026 
Interest Burden  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.972
c 
Cash Flow  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.067
c 
                 
Industry Membership Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  4698  4698  4698  4698  4698  4698  4698  4698 
Log-Likelihood  -651.83  -617.25  -631.72  -604.44  -597.36  -596.48  -597.96  -592.37 
Wald Test  31.45  34.20  91.54  93.31  94.13  94.16  94.18  95.87 
χ
2 test  0.048  0.025  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. Significance Levels: 
a - p<0.01, 
b - p<0.05, 
c- p<0.10   31 
Table 5: Firm-Specific Investment Determinants for Second and Third Investments: All Firms 
  Second Investment  Third Investment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Firm Size/ Productivity                 
Size  1.001  .  1.001  1.001  1.050
b  .  1.050
b  1.051
b 
TFP    1.070
b  1.065
b  1.065




                 
Other Firm Characteristics                 
HHI  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.999  0.945




















 b  1.017
 b 
R&D Expenditures  1.108
 b  1.138
b  1.124
b  1.125
b  0.942  0.980  0.963  0.961 





a  0.922  0.926  0.930  0.930 
                 
Keiretsu Membership                 





                 
Financial Data                 
Gross Revenue  .  .  .  1.021  .  .  .  1.019 
Interest Burden  .  .  .  0.974
c  .  .  .  0.981 
Cash Flow  .  .  .  1.054  .  .  .  1.047 
                 
Industry Member Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  3239  3239  3239  3239  1906  1906  1906  1906 
Log-Likelihood  -207.58  -199.97  -196.76  -195.89  -88.93  -85.79  -82.09  -81.17 
Wald Test  80.89  82.65  84.67  85.29  45.67  46.78  46.99  47.34 
χ
2 test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. Significance Levels: 
a - p<0.01, 
b - p<0.05, 
c- p<0.10   32 
 
Table 6: Firm-Specific Investment Determinants for Multiple Investors Only 
 
  All (Pooled) Investments  First Investments  Second Investment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Firm Size/Productivity                   
Size  1.101
b  .  1.100
 b  1.000  .  1.000  1.000  .  1.001 
TFP  .  1.098
 b  1.097
 b  .  1.141
c  1.139
c  .  1.053
c  1.051
c 
                   
Other Firm Characteristics                   
HHI  0.945
 b  0.952
 b  0.957
 b  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999 
Diversification  1.171
a  1.184
 a  1.185







Export Ratio (Exprt)  1.006
 b  1.009
 b  1.008







R&D Expenditure (R&D)  1.107
 a  1.109









 b  1.088
 b  1.088
 b  .  .  .  .  .  . 
PrevNonManufInvst  0.957
 b  0.968
 b  0.962
 b  0.946
 b  0.9510
 b  0.921
b  0.999  0.997  0.978 




                   
KeiretsuMembership                   
KeiretsuMember  1.196
 b  1.186
 b  1.189
 b  1.054  1.040  1.051  1.096  1.096  1.095 
                   
Financial Data                   
Gross Revenue  .  .  1.043  .  .  1.106  .  .  1.020 
Interest Burden  .  .  0.962
c  .  .  0.984
 c  .  .  0.973
c 
Cash Flow  .  .  1.024
 c  .  .  1.061
c  .  .  1.057 
                   
Industry Member Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log-Likelihood  -805.67  -779.65  -771.85  -242.56  -225.24  -221.15  -167.77  -161.29  -163.24 
Wald Test  88.03  92.03  96.94  90.16  93.92  94.67  87.56  91.56  92.49 
χ
2 test  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. Significance Levels: 
a - p<0.01, 
b - p<0.05, 
c- p<0.10   33 
 
Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier Integrated Hazard Estimates of Individual Investment Stages 
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Appendix Table 1. Additional Regression Table for Pooled Investment History: All Firms 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Size  1.101



























HHI          0.963





















PrevNonManuf                  0.956
c  0.956
c 
Diversification                    1.281
a 
Number of Obs.  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880  5880 
Log-Likelihood  -1529.49  -1431.59  -1421.30  -1418.64  -1415.11  -1413.55  -1407.66  -1403.52  -1400.87  -1380.12 
Wald Test  11.21  11.22  60.41  60.97  96.92  100.08  114.90  129.73  130.15  140.15 
χ
2 test  0.047  0.047  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Coefficients expressed as hazard ratios. Significance Levels: a - p<0.01, ** - p<0.05, *- p<0.10.     
 